



The semiconductor industry is experiencing hard
times. Since July of1984, new orders have fallen by
some 30 percent. Employment in Santa Clara
County, which includes Silicon Valley and hence a
high concentration ofelectronics firms, fell at an
annual rate of 3.6 percent between May and July.
This contrasts with average annual employment
growth ofjust under 4 percent through the first
half of the decade. In addition, August's 6.0 per-
cent unemployment rate in Santa Clara County
was much higher than the 4.3 percent rate that
prevailed last December.
Another indicatorof hard times in the semiconduc-
tor industry is the "book-to-bill" ratio which com-
pares the value of new orders with the value of
products shipped. A book-to-bill ratio of 1.1 is
required to maintain the industry's average annual
20 percent increase in nominal sales. The ratio has
not been above 1.0 since August 1984; it was
stagnant at 0.72 from May through July of this year,
and rose only to 0.74 in August. While the industry
has always followed a boom-bust cycle, the
severity and persistence of the current problems
are causing some to question the long-run viability
of the u.s. semiconductor industry.
Despite its problems, the semiconductor industry
continues to show signs of vitality. Even in Santa
Clara County, for example, employment in July
remained 1.4 percent above its level at the same
time last year, and the August unemployment rate
of 6.0 percent was well below the national rate of
7.0 percent. Indeed, there are several reasons to
expect that the current downturn is a short-run
rather than long-run problem. This Letterargues
that the u.s. semiconductor industry is likely to
resume its long-run growth trend. However, the
direction in which change seems to be headed
suggests that, in the future, domestic jobs in the
semiconductor industry will consist almost entirely
of positions requiring highly sophisticated techni-
cal skills.
long-run trends
Historically, the semiconductor industry has grown
rapidly. New uses for semiconductors and innova-
tions that have reduced the cost of making them
have combined to produce average annual growth
of 20 percent in nominal sales.
As the chart shows, orders of electronic compo-
nents (which include butare not limited to semi-
conductors) have until recently grown more
rapidly than orders ofother manufactured prod-
ucts. This increase in volume has been accom-
panied by profound changes in the industry. The
most obvious change has been technological. As
chips have become more powerful and cheaper to
produce, their uses have become more varied,
prices have fallen, andsales have risen. The
increased variety of products has, in turn, led to
greater specialization in production. For example,
Japanese producers now dominate the market for
64K and 256K memory chips, while U.s. producers
dominate the market for custom chips and those
with telecommunications and military applications.
In addition, the industry is becoming more interna-
tional. More and more, u.s. producers are estab-
lishing factories overseas to reduce labor costs and
improve access to foreign markets. At the same
time, Japanese firms, concerned about possible U.s.
retaliatory trade measures, are establishing produc-
tion facilities in the u.s. Thus, firms and production
facilities are increasingly dispersed throughout the
world. Moreover, firm headquarters and produc-
tion facilities are more likely than ever to be
located in differentcountries.
Sources of current weakness
The stage for the current downturn was being set
in 1983 when 60 percent growth in the numberof
personal computers sold left semiconductor pro-
ducers unable to supply enough chips. Existing U.S.
producers responded by investing in plant and
equipment to expand their capacity to produce.
Meanwhile, overseas producers, particularly from
Japan, took advantage of the shortfall in U.s. pro-
duction capacity by expanding their U.s. market
share. Japanese producers, by dominating the
memory chip market, expanded their share of the
total u.S. market by three percentage points in
1984, to 16 percent.FRBSF
Shortly after the industry developed the ability to
meet chip demand, the fastest growing compo-
nentofdemand, the personal computer market,
weakened. There are two main explanations for
this slowdown. First, some analysts argue that busi-
ness users of personal computers are learning how
to operate the systems they have before making
additional purchases. Although limited uses for
homecomputers may prevent that segment of the
personal computer market from recovering its pre-
vious strength, only a fraction of personal com-
puters - most likely less than 10 percent of sales
- are sold for household use. The alternative
explanation emphasizes the slOWdown in the
national economy, which has reduced business
investments across the board. By either explana-
tion, the current slowdown is but a temporary
deviation from a long-run growth trend and not a
secular slowdown.
Even a short-term slowdown can have enormous
consequences. Estimates ofthe 1985 change in the
numberof personal computers sold range from a
decrease of more than 30 percent to an increase of
30 percent. However, even 30 percent growth
would present hardship for some firms since some.
capital investments were based on euphoric pro-
jections (made in 1983) of100 percent annual
sales growth.
The consequences for semiconductor manufac-
turers have been swift and severe. In the middle of
1984,semiconductororders began falling until, by
the end of1984, chip inventories had built up to as
much as $1.5 billion, Enormous price reductions
and, ultimately, production slowdowns and losses
followed. To the extent thatthe problem is simply
excess inventory accumulation, the current
downturn is no different from previous boom-bust
cycles in the electronics and semiconductor
industries.
However, several other factors have exacerbated
what probably would have been a relatively severe
bust anyway. In particular, the fast pace of tech-
nological innovation, which is the backbone of the
industry, ironically compromises the industry's
ability to adapt to changing market forces. Costs
are especially difficultto cut because research and
development as well as capital expenditures must
continue to receive priority even during a
downturn if firms are to emerge strong in a future
upswing. Moreover, increasingly specialized tech-
nological innovations limit producers' abilities to
switch from the production of one kind of chip to
another as demand changes.
Another factor hurting the u.s. industry is Japan's
growing prominence as a major competitor. The
most recent boom provided an opportunity for
Japanese firms to reap the benefits of their heavy
investments in producing low-costchips. By mak-
ing certain products at lowercost than their Ameri-
can counterparts, theJapanese have forced u.s.
firms to establish smaller market niches, reduce
costs, or both. The high value of the dollar exacer-
bates the threat posed by low-costJapanese firms.
As in other u.S. industries that compete with
foreign producers, the high value of the dollar
makes u.s. products more expensive than foreign
products and therefore hurts sales of products
made in the u.S.
The outlook
The outlook for the u.s. semiconductor industry
depends on several factors. The most important
are growth in productdemand and competitive
position relative to other producers. Competitive
position in turn depends on technological innova-
tion, costs relative to those of other producers, and
the extent and character of market segmentation.
Semiconductor demandwill continue to grow as
long as the technological innovatibn that expands
uses and reduces costs continues to stimulate
increased demand. Household items such as televi-
sion sets and military uses such as surveillance
would be greatly improved by the expanded
capacity of smaller Chips. Factories could be
monitored by robots that can see, and the ability of
machines to recognize voices could make offices
more efficient. Although the pace of expansion will
eventually slow as new uses are exhausted, most
agree that the potential for further growth remains
substantial.
The pattern of specialization in the industry has
actually cushioned U.s. producers somewhat from
the current downswing. Since personal computers
are a major source of demand for the memory
chips in which Japanese producers hold a 70 to 90
percent market share, Japanese firms that export
chips to the U.S. were far more devastated than
u.s. producers when personal computer demand
slowed. One analyst, who in late July anticipated a
20 percent reduction in total U.s. semiconductorMANUFACTURING ORDERS, 1980· 1985
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sales for 1985, expected a decrease of 65 percent
in the sales of memory chips. By concentrating on
custom chips and other products with more stable
demand, u.s. producers can continue to insulate
themselves from the more excessive ups and
downs of the industry.
Traditionally, U.s. firms have enjoyed technological
superiority over their foreign rivals. Their greater
innovativeness is generally attributed to the
relatively unstructured environment at many U.S.
firms. This environment is claimed to foster
creativity while the American cultural and eco-
nomic system encourages risk-taking. Furthermore,
venture capital, which is more readily available in
the u.s. than elsewhere, facilitates innovative
research and risky investment projects. If this pat-
tern continues, U.s. producers should be able to
retain their technological advantage in innovative
and custom chips.
As technological advances yield more sophisti-
cated products, the production process is likely to
require a more highly skilled work force. For exam-
ple, "super-chips," which some analysts expectto
be mass produced in the 1990s, are extremely
small and intricate. The only human workers
required are likely to be programmers who instruct
the computers how to design and make the chips.
To recruit the necessary talent, U.S. firms will prob-
ably locate their plants in this country rather than
overseas.
The influx ofJapanese firms setting up plants in the
U.S. (in part to avoid potential retaliatory trade
measures) will likely provide a limited additional
source ofsemiconductorjobs. Traditionally,
Japanese firms have employed relatively more
capital and less labor than u.s. firms because the'
price of capital in Japan is lower relative to the
price of labor than in the u.s. There is even greater
incentive forJapanese firms to economize on labor
when they invest their low-cost capital in U.s. pro-
duction since U.s. workers are among the most
highly paid in the world.
Conclusions
In spite of the current problems in the semiconduc-
tor industry, there appears to be a strong trelJd
toward greater semiconductor use, and toward
continued innovation. As long as this innovation
continues to produce more powerful chips at
lower costs, overall sales should resume their
upward climb. While the present situation may
cause some firms to fail, the industry as a whole
should regain its health in the long.-run.
The trends also suggest that the industry will
become increasingly multinational, that research
and development will continue to be vital, and
that production in the u.s. (by both domestic and
foreign-based firms) will be increasingly capital
intensive and sophisticated. Therefore, a healthy
u.s. semiconductor industry in the future will prob-
ably require only employees with substantial tech-
nical skill, and consequently will not yield abun-
dant low-skilled and semi-skilled jobs.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
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Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 194,298 - 272 11,483 6.2
Loans and Leases1 6 175,050 - 392 11,106 6.7
Commercial and Industrial 50,822 - 24 814 1.6
Real estate 64,546 60 3,474 5.6
Loans to Individuals 35,915 111 5,864 19.5
Leases 5,414 - 1 368 7.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,075 111 257 2.1
OtherSecurities2 7,173 9 122 1.7
Total Deposits 196,816 - 1,774 8,952 4.7
Demand Deposits 45,614 - 1,463 2,403 5.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,126 - 539 3,061 10.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,435 - 508 1,532 12.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,766 197 5,015 3.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,973 - 140 7,423 19.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,636 365 - 2,415 - 5.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,430 1,179 528 2.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change